The risk of a reputation loss can provide an informal enforcement mechanism when contracts are incomplete. This paper provides evidence that reputation and formal incentives to monitor are substitutes in the context of syndicated credit. Monitoring in a loan syndicate is delegated to lead banks, whose formal incentives are determined by their share of the loan. Exploiting as a source of variation the reputation loss suffered by banks actively lending to …rms subsequently involved in fraud scandals, we use within-…rm estimators to show that monitoring banks face higher-powered contracts -higher loan shares-after a reputation loss. Despite the substitution towards higher contractual incentives, banks supply less credit and borrower …nancial policy and investment are a¤ected, indicating that formal incentives are an imperfect substitute for reputation.
I. Introduction
What drives banks' incentives to monitor is a long-standing question in research and policy on …nancial intermediation. 1 Assessing this question empirically gains importance as …nancial innovations -i.e., securitization, loan sales, loan syndication, CDSs-weaken the link between bank returns and borrower defaults, potentially diminishing banks'contractual incentives to monitor (see Keys, Mukherjee, Seru and Vig (2008) , and Su… and Mian (2009) for recent evidence). This paper explores the role of bank reputation as a non-contractual incentive mechanism to monitor.
The theoretical role of reputation in ameliorating moral hazard in contexts where contracts are incomplete has been highlighted as early as in Friedman (1962) , Akerlof (1970) , and Fama (1980) . In the banking context, a …nancial institution's future cash ‡ows from origination, information collection, and underwriting depend crucially on investors' belief that banks, both, possess an e¤ective monitoring technology and are willing to use it on their behalf.
If limits to contracting are severe, banks will have an incentive to invest to prevent events that can be associated with incompetence or misbehavior as a delegated monitor. 2 To date, however, the quantitative magnitude of reputation in …nancial markets remains unexplored.
This paper provides evidence that bank reputation can substitute for formal contractual incentives to monitor. It does so in the context of the syndicated credit market. Syndicated lending, in which two or more lenders provide funds to a …rm under a common loan contract, provides a unique setting for analyzing reputation incentives to monitor. In a syndicated loan, one or more "lead" banks are responsible for monitoring the borrower, while the remaining "participant"banks provide part of the funding of the loan. The share of the funding provided by the lead bank is the sole source of contractual incentives to monitor. These two features simplify greatly the analysis of incentives and contracting relative to contexts in which the …nancial claims of the monitor and the principal di¤er greatly, or where contracts are complex (i.e., debt versus equity holders). In addition, from a theory standpoint, the unobservability of monitoring, the limited contractual incentives, and the repeated nature of the syndication process give scope for reputation as a commitment device. From an econometric standpoint, syndicated loans allow implementing within-…rm estimators discussed below.
To identify the role of reputation as an incentive device, we estimate the e¤ect of a negative shock to a bank's reputation on the contractual incentives it faces in the syndicated debt market. We show in a simple theoretical framework that a reputation loss by a lender results in higher-powered contractual incentives in equilibrium when reputation and contractual incentives are substitutes. As a source of variation in lender monitoring reputation, we exploit the unprecedented series of corporate frauds that occurred between September 2001 and June 2002 in the U.S.. Beginning with the demise of Enron and culminating with that of WorldCom, at the time the largest corporate bankruptcy in history, seven high pro…le corporate frauds occurred during this short period. 3 The failure to detect, or unwillingness to report, the fraudulent activity that resulted in large scale investor expropriation had a potentially severe and unanticipated negative e¤ect on the reputation of banks responsible for monitoring.
Our estimation method compares how the contractual incentives faced by banks whose reputation was tarnished changes after the fraud discoveries, relative to the contractual incentives to banks una¤ected by the events. To account for potential confounding e¤ects, we perform this comparison within the same …rm. Our within-…rm di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator exploits two features of syndicated credit markets: 1) …rms access syndicated credit markets frequently, and 2) syndicated loans have multiple lead arrangers as well as multiple participants. We compare -for the same …rm-how the relative amount of lead to participant debt provided by banks that su¤ered a reputation loss changes with respect to those that did not. The within-…rm estimator is consistent in the presence of changes in the extensive lending margin (composition of borrowing …rms), and accounts for all …rm-speci…c time series variation, including changes in credit demand and creditworthiness, in the intensive lending margin. Accounting for potential changes in creditworthiness is particularly important in our empirical context, since corporate fraud is more likely to be discovered when borrower creditworthiness worsens.
Our results show that, conditional on participating as a lead arranger with monitoring responsibilities in a syndicated loan, banks that have their reputations tarnished take on larger loan shares. The change in contractual incentives is substantial: banks that su¤er a reputation loss must increase their share of a loan by 10 percentage points, from a prefraud average of 30, when they participate in a syndicated loan as a lead bank after the fraud discovery. The …ndings suggest that monitoring reputation is a key determinant of monitoring incentives and that it substitutes for contractual incentives in the loan syndication market.
The stock returns of banks actively involved in monitoring the fraudulent companies suggest that the reputation losses are also associated with substantial bank value losses. For example, the portfolio of banks that issued new syndicated loans to Enron during the year before its fraud discovery experiences a negative abnormal return of 3% during the 20 days surrounding the announcement of the …rm's bankruptcy, when compared to banks with no lending relationship to the troubled …rm. The magnitude of the decline is twice as large for the banks directly responsible for monitoring as lead arrangers in the loan syndicates (J.P.
Morgan Chase and CitiBank). The magnitude of the negative return is di¢ cult to reconcile with banks'size relative to the potential direct losses due to the demise of Enron. Consistent with the monitoring reputation mechanism, the same group of banks were the target of lawsuits for alleged accounting irregularities, breaches in …duciary duties, or negligence in monitoring and underwriting activities related to Enron. 4 Our empirical setting allows us to explore further the real e¤ects of non-contractual incentives to monitor through reputation. We employ the within-…rm estimator in Khwaja and Mian (2008) to identify the e¤ect of the reputation shock on the supply of credit. The estimator compares the amount of funding provided by a¤ected and una¤ected banks, before and after the fraud events, to the same …rm. The estimates suggest that exposed lenders reduce substantially their credit supply after fraud is discovered. Lender participation in new syndicated debt drops by 38% during the year after the discovery of the Enron fraud when their reputation is a¤ected.
Estimating the e¤ect of the reputation shock on …rm level outcomes, i.e., leverage or investment, requires stronger identi…cation assumptions. To account for changes in investment opportunities, we compare outcomes of …rms in the same industry, location, and size quintile, but that di¤er in the identity of their main lender. We show that although the ‡ow of debt to …rms whose main lenders were exposed and not-exposed to the reputation shock evolve in parallel before the Enron fraud is discovered, exposed …rms' new syndicated credit as a fraction of assets drops by 0.8 percentage points (32% of the mean) during the two years after the Enron fraud discovery. The decline results exclusively from a reduction in lending by exposed banks. There is also evidence of debt substitution: non-exposed bank syndicated lending increases by 15% during the year after the shock and …rm overall leverage does not change.
Despite the observed substitution, average loan spreads increase by 33 basis points after the shock (17% of the average). Also, …rms increase the cash holdings in the medium run, and investment in …xed assets declines in the short run. These …ndings are in line with recent theoretical models that consider the role of corporate cash holdings as precautionary bu¤er stocks (Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) , Riddick and Whited (2008) ). In particular, our results con…rm the predictions in Bolton, Chen, and Wang (2009) that an exogenous increase in external …nancing costs induces cash hoarding and lower investment.
Existing evidence of the empirical relevance of …rm reputation on contracts is focused on environments with severe contracting limitations. 5 Greif (1989 Greif ( , 1991 , for example, argues that a reputation based mechanism mitigated agency problems among the eleventh-century 5 See MacLeod (2007) for a recent survey.
Maghribi traders in the absence of law-based institutions. Banerjee and Du ‡o (p. 989: 2000) analyze the customized software industry in India, where "the legal infrastructure is widely seen as quite primitive, limiting the scope for contracts."Our results emphasize that reputation can play a signi…cant role in shaping the economic behavior of agents in developed legal environments. Regarding external validity, it is likely that the role of reputation is potentially ampli…ed in our empirical context, since …nancial markets are characterized by severe agency problems and complex contingent outcomes.
Prior work on the role of bank reputation on …nancial contracts explores the cross sectional correlation between bank reputation, proxied as bank market share or experience, and the characteristics of …nancial contracts. 6 Our central contribution is to show how contracts change when the reputation capital is depleted. The results also highlight a novel mechanism through which the banking sector can transmit and amplify real shocks. The traditional empirical work on the lending channel literature has focused on whether …nancing frictions exist. 7 The results in this paper highlight an important economic mechanism behind the transmission of shocks through the …nancial sector. Negative shocks can break down reputation as a source of non-contractual incentives and lead to a decline in the supply of capital and investment.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the empirical setting and provides a simple theoretical framework for the analysis. Section III describes the two estimation methods employed in the empirical analysis. Section IV describes the data sources and provides summary statistics. Section V presents the empirical results and Section VI concludes. 6 See for example Fang (2005) and the references therein for studies on the correlation of bank market share with the price and quality of underwriting services. Similar references related to Venture Capital reputation can be found in Hsu (2004) . In the context of syndicated lending, Su… (2007) shows a (negative) correlation between bank market share and lead bank shares. 7 For a theoretical treatment see Bernanke and Blinder (1988) , Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Stein (1998) . For evidence, see Khwaja and Mian (2008) and Paravisini (2008) .
II. Empirical Setting and Framework
This section provides a brief description of the syndicated loan market characteristics, emphasizing those that make it an interesting laboratory to study the role of reputation in …nancial contracts. Then it provides an account of the corporate fraud events and their potential e¤ect on bank reputation. Finally it provides a simple theoretical framework that delivers the implications of a lender reputation loss on the syndicated credit contracts.
A. Syndicated Lending
Syndicated credit is a common contractual arrangement in corporate capital sourcing, accounting for over 50% of the corporate …nance in the U.S. during our sample period (Weidner (2000) ). In a syndicated loan, two or more banks agree to jointly make a loan to a borrower under common terms and conditions. Members of the syndicate fall into one of two groups.
The "lead arrangers"of the syndicate are responsible for assessing borrower creditworthiness prior to issuing the loan and monitoring the …rm after the loan has been issued. The lead arrangers also negotiate the terms of the loan agreement, and administer the documentation, funding, and repayments. Lead arrangers collect an up front fee for these services. "Participant" banks in the syndicate provide funding with little or no direct contact with the borrower. After negotiating contract terms with the borrower, lead arrangers prepare documentation that contains information about the borrower's repayment prospects. Participants use this documentation to make a decision of whether to provide funding to the syndicate under the stipulated contract characteristics, and in which amount. 8
There are three key characteristics of the syndicated loan market that make it an ideal laboratory for studying the role of reputation incentives in bank monitoring decisions. First, syndication reduces the lead bank's expected loss in case of loan default, in a similar fashion as securitization and loan sales do. As a result, syndication reduces the monitoring incentives relative to standard single lender credit, a setting already ailed by contracting limitations.
Second, lead and participant banks have identical claims on …rm cash ‡ows except for one dimension: their relative shares of the total loan (and the lead bank fee, which is collected upfront). This simpli…es greatly the analysis of incentives and contracting between the informed and uninformed lenders relative to a setting in which informed and uninformed lenders have claims with varying information sensitivity (i.e., debt versus equity holders). In the theory framework and the empirical analysis we will focus on this observable contract characteristic, lead shares, to pin down predictions that are unique to the reputation mechanism. Third, syndicate members interact repeatedly to write one time contracts to issue loans to existing or new borrowers. The lack of long term agreements among lead arrangers and participants suggests that state-contingent outcomes are too complex to allow contracting over all outcomes at a reasonable cost (Hart and Moore (1988) ). Contracting limits and repeated interactions allow reputation to play a role in the syndicated credit market. The Enron and WorldCom frauds entailed repeated accounting manipulations to cover liabilities, hide expenses, and create the appearance of pro…ts and growth. Enron, for example, made use of mark-to-market accounting to overstate the value of long term contracts, and the use of special purpose entities to o¤-load losses and liabilities from its balance sheet (Healy 9 The information in this section comes from Enron and WorldCom regulatory …lings to the SEC, banruptcy …ling documents, Enron Creditors Recovery Corporation, and press reports from LexisNexis.
10 See press article: Bumiller, E., "Corporate Conduct: Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud In Corporations", The New York Times, July 31 2002. and Palepu (2003)). WorldCom delayed the reporting of expenses and operating costs in excess of $9 billion by classifying them as long-term investments. In both cases, sustained poor operating performance and falling stock prices led their CEOs to step down and facilitated the discovery of accounting irregularities. The SEC investigations into the frauds resulted in criminal and civil charges against top executives of both companies.
Several of the largest …nancial institutions in the U.S. by asset size had direct monitoring responsibilities of the two companies during the months that preceded the fraud discoveries. Corporation (ECRC) …led complaints against 11 major banks and …nancial institutions for the "alleged involvement of those banks in the fraud, breaches of …duciary duties, and civil conspiracy that created losses in the tens of billions of dollars." 11 Citigroup alone reported $1.66 billion in payments and $4.25 billion in forgone claims agreed upon to settle Enronrelated fraud litigation in 2008. Also, Citigroup and J.P. Morgan Chase were named, among others, as defendants in lawsuits related to alleged accounting irregularities in the books and records of WorldCom and the underwriting of its debt securities. In the latter, defendants were accused that they "either knew or were reckless or negligent in not knowing that the securities were sold to plainti¤s on the basis of misrepresentations and omissions of material facts concerning the …nancial condition of WorldCom." 12
C. Theoretical Implications of a Lender Reputation Loss
We present a brief discussion of the implications of a bank reputation loss on the structure of syndicated loans. We guide our discussion using a stylized model chosen solely to capture how the reputation loss a¤ects lead bank shares. We also discuss the implications extensions to the simple framework.
C.1. Simple Syndication Technology
Consider a lender that has access to an investment opportunity (loan) where a $1 investment produces an expected payo¤ of R. With probability 1 p fraud occurs and the payo¤ is zero. The lender has a proprietary monitoring technology that allows it to increase p (reduce the fraud probability) at some cost f (p), with f increasing and convex. The magnitude of p can be interpreted in reduced form as the monitoring level.
The lender also has access to a syndication technology, that allows it to fund only a fraction s of the investment (syndicate participants invest 1 s). The lender gains an amount g(s) from syndication, where g(1) = 0, g 0 (s) < 0, and g 00 (s) < 0. This function captures in reduced form the diversi…cation, regulatory arbitrage, or other bene…ts from syndication. In exchange for syndication the lead arranger charges an up-front fee T . Thus, the per-period pro…t function of the lead arranger is T t + s t (p t R 1) f (p t ) + g (s t ). For simplicity we assume that the lead arranger is a monopolist and charges the up-front fee that makes the participants break even: T t = (1 s t ) (p t R 1).
C.2. Moral Hazard in Monitoring
Monitoring by the lead arranger is unobservable by the participants. Only whether fraud occurs or not can be contracted upon. In the one-period game with asymmetric information, the syndication contract characteristics T and s are chosen …rst, and then the lead bank makes a monitoring choice to maximize per-period pro…ts. Thus, the lead arranger chooses p such that: 13
The share s is chosen to maximize per period pro…ts of the lead arranger subject to the break-even constraint of the participants and the incentive compatibility constraint (1). The optimal share of the lead arranger is given implicitly by:
C.3. Reputation
The role for reputation arises in the repeated in…nite-horizon game. We assume that the lead arranger and the participants are restricted to writing a sequence of one period contracts.
This assumption seems restrictive given the simplicity of the payo¤s, but re ‡ects accurately the contracting environment in syndicated lending.
The following state-contingent strategies by the lead and the participants are an equilibrium that represents a Pareto improvement over the static equilibrium. The participants accept to pay a fee higher than the one implied by the one-period game at time 0 and in every period thereafter, as long as no fraud occurred in each preceding period. If fraud occurs, i.e., if the reputation of the lead arranger is tarnished, fees and shares revert to the one-period equilibrium. For simplicity we consider only the case where this reversion lasts forever (in general, a …nite reversion period will be optimal). The optimization problem in the repeated game setting is given by:
where V o is the discounted present value of one-period game pro…ts received in perpetuity.
The lead arranger's monitoring level satis…es: 13 The superindex o stands for "one-period".
The incentive compatibility constraint in the in…nite-horizon setting (3) implies that for any given lead share, the lead arranger chooses a higher level of monitoring than in the oneperiod game. The reason is that the lead arranger takes into consideration the value of the future pro…ts that can be derived from maintaining its reputation as a good monitor.
In short, reputation enhances the lead arranger's commitment power to monitor. If fraud occurs and the reputation of the lead arranger is damaged, the level of monitoring for any given contractual incentives s reverts to the lower level implied by (1).
C.4. Reputation Loss and Lead Share
Our relationship of interest is the e¤ect of a reputation loss on the lead bank share.
This relationship depends the functional form of (2). 14 Under the standard assumption that the cost of inducing monitoring e¤ort is convex in contractual incentives, i.e., if the cost in units of s of inducing the same 1% increase in monitoring p is higher at higher levels of p, then the non-contractual incentives to monitor through reputation and the contractual incentives through lead shares are substitutes. 15 Intuitively, reputation incentives induce higher monitoring levels for free, which increases the marginal cost of contractual incentives.
This implies that a reputation loss will result in larger lead bank shares in equilibrium. This is the key prediction that we take to the data to identify the reputation channel.
C.5. Discussion
A similar set of predictions can be delivered through a model where lead banks are heterogeneous in the productivity of their monitoring technologies, f 0 (p). 16 In such speci…cation, participants use observed fraud realizations to update beliefs about bank monitoring produc- 14 It is straightforward to show that the optimal share in the repeated game setting is also given by (2). 15 This occurs when f 000 > 0 in this setting. 16 See Fudenberg and Maskin (1982) and MacLeod (2007) for a theoretical discussion and Banerjee and Du ‡o (2000) for an application to the Indian custom software industry. tivity and the share of a lead arranger is declining the lead arranger's monitoring reputation.
This implies that after a fraud is observed, participants'priors about the monitoring ability of the lead arranger are revised downwards and the lead share of the loan increases. The two models have identical predictions regarding the lead arranger shares. We attempt to distinguish them empirically through their distinct predictions of a reputation loss on the secondary market prices of syndicated loans.
The framework is limited in several respects. First, we have assumed that loans have a …xed size. The introduction of variable loan size complicates the analysis because it requires considering how loan size a¤ects monitoring costs and the repayment probability. Under the standard assumption that higher leverage ampli…es moral hazard problems between the bank and the …rm, then loan size will be smaller after a negative reputation shock, but the predicted change in the lead bank share is unaltered. 17 A second restriction of our model is that it delivers predictions for a given project profitability R. In an extension with project heterogeneity, the lowest pro…tability projects will not be …nanced after the reputation shock. The change in the project quality pool after the reputation shock poses a problem for the empirical estimation in general, because project pro…tability is unobservable. However, the within-…rm estimation discussed below fully accounts for this selection issue.
Third, we have ignored the incentive problem and reputation concerns of the participant banks regarding their own suppliers of capital. Participant banks must choose an unobservable screening e¤ort when deciding whether to provide funds in a syndicated loan. It is possible that a bad outcome also a¤ects the reputation of participant banks and the contracts between them and their capital suppliers. We can explore this indirectly by looking at the e¤ect of the Enron/WorldCom events on the supply of credit of participant banks in lending syndicates to these …rms. 17 That is, the cost of monitoring is a function of loan size L: f (p; L), and f L > 0. Under this assumption a lower loan size may increase or decrease monitoring incentives, depending on the magnitude of f pL . Thus, allowing loan size to vary may weaken or amplify the e¤ect of the reputation loss on the share of the lead arranger relative to the …xed loan size model, but the prediction on the sign of the change remains unaltered.
III. Estimation

A. Lead Bank Share and Credit Supply
The key challenge in estimating the e¤ect of a reputation shock on conditional lead shares is that the share of the lead arranger will also change in response to variations in …rm creditworthiness. For example if a borrower's quality drops after the fraud events, banks'
incentives to monitor/screen the …rm change and so do the incentives provided to the lead arranger in equilibrium.
We adapt the within-…rm estimator in Khwaja and Mian (2008) to account for this and other potential confounding e¤ects related to time-varying …rm shocks. Our estimator exploits the fact that syndicated loans have multiple lead arrangers as well as multiple participants.
Intuitively, we compare -for the same …rm-the change in the share of lead debt provided by banks a¤ected by the frauds to the same change by banks una¤ected by them. Our counterfactual, the change in lead shares among banks una¤ected by the reputation shock, accounts for all time-varying …rm characteristics.
We estimate the following within-…rm di¤erence-in-di¤erences speci…cation:
The variable y ijl is (log) ‡ow of new syndicated debt by bank type j (j = 1 for banks a¤ected by the reputation shock) to …rm i. The subindex l captures the fact that banks can supply debt as a lead arranger or a participant in a syndicated loan (l = 1 if lead). In line with Khwaja and Mian (2008) and Bertrand, Du ‡o, and Mullainathan (2004), we collapse the pre-fraud and post-fraud periods into one observation to reduce the bias introduced by serial correlation. Thus, the dependent variable is the change in the average ‡ow of syndicated credit from bank j, with syndicate role l, to …rm i, before and after the beginning of the fraud scandal wave in the third quarter of 2000. The pre-fraud period includes the eight calendar quarters before the Enron bankruptcy announcement. We use a 1-year and a 2-year post-fraud periods in the estimations to explore the dynamics of the shock on credit outcomes.
The …rst right-hand side variable is a …rm …xed e¤ect (FE). Including the FE in the …rst di¤erenced equation is equivalent to introducing …rm-quarter dummies in a panel estimation.
In other words, the …rm FE accounts for all time varying determinants of debt ‡ow levels.
The …rst right-hand side variable of interest, ExposedBank, is a dummy equal to one for exposed banks (when j = 1). The coe¢ cient on this variable represents the proportional change in debt ‡ows by banks exposed to the fraud events relative to not-exposed banks, to the same …rm. The coe¢ cient on this variable, 0 , is the within-…rm estimator of the e¤ect of the shock on the supply of credit from Khwaja and Mian (2008) .
The second right-hand side variable, LeadDebt, is a dummy equal to one for debt supplied by banks in a lead role in the syndicate. Its coe¢ cient, 1 , represents the average change in lead debt ‡ow relative to participant debt ‡ow to the same …rm before and after the fraud events. Our main variable of interest is the interaction between the exposed bank dummy and the lead debt dummy. The coe¢ cient on this variable, 3 , re ‡ects how the proportion of lead to participant debt ‡ows changes di¤erentially for banks a¤ected by the corporate frauds relative to banks whose reputations were not exposed.
B. Identifying Assumptions and Bias
Within-…rm estimators are robust to …rm selection issues because they are obtained from variation in the intensive lending margin. The estimate of the e¤ect on the supply of credit, 0 , is obtained only from the subset of …rms that receive syndicated credit from banks a¤ected and una¤ected by the reputation shocks before and after the scandals. The estimate for the e¤ect on the lead bank shares, 2 , is obtained from …rms that also receive lead and participant debt from both types of banks before and after the shock. Thus, within-…rm estimates are consistent even if a reputation loss induces banks to lend to di¤erent types of …rms.
To understand the identi…cation assumptions behind the within-…rm estimators it is useful to spell out under which circumstances they are violated. It is easier to begin with 0 , the estimate for the e¤ect on the supply of credit. This coe¢ cient is negative if the reputation shock induces banks to reduce their credit supply. The magnitude of this coe¢ cient represents the proportional credit supply reduction, as long as banks whose reputation remained intact do not increase their credit supply in response. If non-a¤ected banks supply more funding to the syndicate in response, 0 will be biased upwards. This can occur in practice because the negative credit supply shock by a¤ected banks induces the …rm to demand more credit from other banks. This upward bias is, however, bounded. In the extreme case where non-a¤ected banks fully substitute the lending reduction by a¤ected banks, the estimated parameter 0 will be twice the true e¤ect of the reputation shock on the supply of credit. We take this e¤ect into consideration when interpreting the results and explore directly whether substitution occurs using an alternate identi…cation strategy, discussed in the next subsection.
The estimate of the reputation shock on the proportion of lead debt, 2 , will be biased if the change in lead shares of banks a¤ected by the reputation shock in turn a¤ects the lead shares of una¤ected banks. This can occur if there are strategic complementarities in the monitoring activities of a¤ected and una¤ected lead arrangers. Existing research suggests that lead bank activities are strategic complements, since lead banks have specialized roles within the syndicate (François and Missonier-Piera (2007)). This implies that the within-…rm estimate of 2 will be biased downwards. Intuitively, the bank that su¤ers the reputation shock monitors less in equilibrium, which reduces the incentives of the una¤ected bank to monitor, which in turn leads to larger lead shares for una¤ected banks in equilibrium. Thus, we expect our estimates of 2 to be conservatively biased. 18
C. Firm Level Outcomes
Within-…rm estimates cannot be obtained for …rm level outcomes (i.e. total syndicated funding, leverage, investment). To account for variation of investment opportunities in the estimation of the e¤ect of the reputation shock on …rm level outcomes, we compare …rms in the same industry, location, and size quintile, but that di¤er in the identity of their main lender. To illustrate the estimation procedure with an example, consider two …rms in our sample: Cone Mills Corp. and Guilford Mills Inc.. 19 was not. The identi…cation strategy relies on the assumption that …rm speci…c changes in investment opportunities are, on average, unrelated to the identity of their main lender after controlling for industry, location, and size speci…c shocks. We validate this assumption below by showing that outcomes of the exposed and not-exposed …rms evolve in parallel prior to the fraud events.
Thus, we estimate the e¤ect of the reputation shock on …rm level outcomes using the …rm …xed e¤ects panel speci…cation:
The dependent variable is an outcome for …rm i at quarter t. The right-hand side variable of interest is the interaction between a dummy equal to one if the …rm is classi…ed as exposed to the shock (as discussed below), and a dummy equal to one for the post-shock period (after the third quarter of 2000). The interaction coe¢ cient represents the change in outcomes of the exposed …rms relative to the not-exposed …rms, our measure of the e¤ect of the shock.
To account for credit demand shocks we include a full set of industry, state of incorporation, and size quartile dummies, interacted with the post-shock period dummy. These account for average outcome changes that are common across all …rms in the same industry, location, and size. 19 We deliberately chose small, bank-dependent, …rms for this example. A bank credit supply shock can plausibly a¤ect the …nancing costs only for …rms whose marginal source of …nance is bank debt. In unreported results we show that only …rms with no access to public debt markets (no commercial paper rating) are a¤ected in our sample.
IV. Data and Variable De…nitions
A. DealScan
The DealScan database is collected by Reuters/Loan Pricing Corporation from SEC and Federal Reserve …lings, and directly from private debt markets. The initial sample contains information on 69,055 loan facilities (78% syndicated) issued by 5,868 di¤erent lenders to U.S. …rms from 1990 to 2005. In theory, it is straightforward to obtain the loan amounts outstanding using information on the facility initiation date, the amount of each facility, the shares of each lender in the facility. In practice, however, the data on the lender shares is incomplete or missing in 69% of the facilities. We exclude from the analysis sample all facilities that are missing all information on lender shares (44%). Because the within-…rm estimates compare syndicated loans to the same …rm before and after the fraud events, they are internally consistent in the presence of potential selection issues that may arise due to missing data. However, syndicates with complete share information are on average larger, both in loan amount and number of participants, than those with missing information. 20
Thus, our analysis sample is not representative of the universe of syndicated loans.
We impute lender shares for the facilities where shares are incomplete to increase the sample size, although our results are robust to this imputation. 21 After the imputation 56% of facilities have complete lender share information. Using the sample with complete information we construct a database including lender shares, DealScan lender ID, DealScan borrower …rm ID, and other facility information. 20 The median syndicated facility with complete (incomplete) share information has 7 (3) banks and an amount of $150 million ($70 million). 21 The imputation proceeded in the following …ve steps. 1) Facilities with incomplete lead bank shares (0.08%): we assign the median value of available lead bank shares to each lead bank without a share in the same facility. At the end of this step, the information of the shares of lead banks is either all complete or all missing. 2) Facilities with all missing lead bank shares, but with some participant bank shares (0.26%): we …rst assign the median value of available participant bank shares to each participant bank without a share. The unassigned share we distribute evenly across the lead banks. 3) Facilities with complete lead bank shares but all or some missing participant bank shares (1.47%): assign the remaining share equally amongst all participant banks without a share. 4) Facilities without lead banks and the lender shares are all or partially missing (23.31%): assign the remaining share equally among all banks without a share. 5) Facilities with all lead bank shares missing but all participant bank shares complete (0.28%): assign the remaining share equally among all lead banks Table I shows the list of the top 40 syndicated lenders by number of facilities during the   four quarters before the Enron Bankruptcy. The table shows the fraction of syndicated lending to Enron, WorldCom, and other …rms involved in corporate fraud scandals. The table shows a substantial overlap in the set of banks that had a lending relationship with Enron, WorldCom and the other fraudulent …rms. For this reason we cannot exploit the variation induced by each fraud independently. We de…ne a lender as exposed to a fraud event if it participated in loan facilities to Enron (49 banks) or WorldCom (28 banks) during the four quarters prior to Enron's bankruptcy. The magnitude and statistical signi…cance of the results is robust to an exposure de…nition that also includes lending relationships to Adelphia Communications, Global Crossing, KMART, and Qwest Communications International, whose frauds were uncovered during the same period.
B. De…nition of Bank Exposure and Summary Statistics
We de…ne bank exposure using lending relationships established before the beginning of the corporate fraud wave because the likelihood of lending relationships will be endogenously a¤ected by fraud discovery. In some speci…cations, we de…ne a lender as exposed if it is the lead arranger to Enron or WorldCom during the same period. Note from Table I that exposed banks are the largest players in the syndicated market both by number of facilities and by volume of lending. The fraction of the syndicated lending ‡ow allocated to the fraudulent …rms, 0.0092, is small on average. Among the exposed banks, this fraction is relatively smaller for the largest banks in the sample and the lead banks.
We hand-match the lender names in DealScan with the lender names in National Information Center, a repository of …nancial data and institution characteristics collected by the Federal Reserve System. We obtain the RSSN ID from this site which is then used to match DealScan with Call Report data to obtain lender …nancial statements. Among the 5,868 lenders in the full DealScan sample, 193 banks are identi…ed to have unique RSSN ID and appear in the Call Report in the third quarter of 2001. These 193 banks are then collapsed at the parent bank level to have 100 unique RSSN ID for their parent banks. We …nally hand-match these 100 parent banks to CRSP, to obtain a subsample of sixty-seven public banks. 22 Figure 1 plots the cumulative value-weighted returns of the portfolios of banks classi…ed as exposed and not-exposed to Enron and WorldCom during the 20 trading days surrounding each company's bankruptcy announcement. Panel A shows that banks classi…ed as exposed to Enron experience on average a 2% decline in returns relative to the not-exposed banks around Enron's bankruptcy. The decline in returns is around 5% for banks exposed as lead arrangers to Enron. Similar patterns are shown in Panel B around the WorldCom bankruptcy.
These plots indicate that our exposure classi…cation provides a meaningful proxy for the vulnerability of bank returns to shocks to Enron and WorldCom. The magnitude of the estimated e¤ect is di¢ cult to reconcile with the size of the direct exposure of these banks to Enron and WorldCom through syndicated lending shown in Table I .
We limit the …rm population to …rms that had at least one loan facility reported in DealScan between the fourth quarter of 2000 and the …rst quarter of 2002 and that are not in …nancial or utility industries. In some speci…cations we will also exclude …rms in the telecommunications, energy, electrical equipment, and software industries, all potentially directly related to Enron, WorldCom, and the other fraudulent …rms through commercial links. Table II presents the descriptive statistics of the structure of the syndicated loans to our …nal sample of …rms during the four quarters before the Enron bankruptcy. The fraction of total syndicated credit …nanced by banks in the lead role is 29.7% (panel 1). In contrast, the unweighted average fraction of lead arranger participation over the full …rm sample is 70.6% (panel 2). This is in line with existing evidence on the syndicated loan market that documents a larger lead bank share in loans to smaller …rms. Also, the lead bank share in the subsample of syndicated debt by exposed banks is 37.7%, re ‡ecting the fact that exposed banks in our sample lend to larger …rms on average. Some speci…cations rely on classifying …rms according to their exposure through their main lenders. We de…ne a …rm to be exposed to the corporate frauds if it had at least one loan facility between the fourth quarter of 2000 and the …rst quarter of 2002 in which at least one participant in the syndicate is exposed to Enron or WorldCom, and zero otherwise. 23 To obtain …rm …nancial statement data we hand-match the …rm names in DealScan with …rm names in COMPUSTAT -North America. Among …rms that had at least one loan facility between the fourth quarter of 2000 and the …rst quarter of 2002, 1,368 are private …rms and 1,358 are publicly-traded …rms with unique GVKEY in COMPUSTAT. After excluding private …rms and …rms in the mentioned industries, our …nal …rm sample includes 1,193 public …rms. Table III presents the …rm descriptive statistics during the four quarters before the Enron bankruptcy. Firms classi…ed as exposed (587) are larger on average than nonexposed …rms, as measured by market capitalization. This is expected since exposed banks are larger and tend to lend to larger …rms. The amount of syndicated credit scaled by …rm assets, however, is the same on average among exposed and not-exposed …rms, and so is leverage. We show evidence below that our speci…cations account for observed and unobserved di¤erences across exposed and not-exposed …rms that are related to syndicated lending and other outcomes. Figure 2 shows the time series of the fraction of debt as a lead arranger for exposed and not-exposed banks in our sample, conditioning on deals where a bank participated as a lead arranger. The pre-Enron means have been removed from the series to facilitate the comparison. The two vertical lines mark the beginning and end of the corporate fraud wave.
V. Empirical Results
A. Unconditional Evidence
The plot shows that the conditional share as lead arrangers of exposed and not-exposed banks evolve in parallel before the frauds. After the fraud wave, the share as lead arrangers of exposed banks increases relative to not-exposed banks. The increase is substantial: there is a 10 percentage point di¤erence in the lead shares of exposed and not-exposed banks a year after the fraud wave. Figure 3 plots the time series of the unconditional ‡ow of new syndicated credit by exposed and not-exposed banks during the same period. Panel A plots total funding, and panels B and C plot separately funding as lead and as a participant in a syndicate. The …gures show that the syndicated debt ‡ow of exposed and not-exposed banks move together until the third quarter of 2001, when the debt of exposed banks declines relative to not-exposed banks. The lending decline occurs regardless of the role of the bank in the syndicate and also appears to be substantial: exposed bank syndicated debt grows on average at a 40% to 50% slower rate than not-exposed bank debt during the two years following the Enron scandal.
Figures 2 and 3 together imply that exposed banks supply less syndicated credit overall, and in particular supply less credit as lead arrangers after the fraud events. But conditional on being a lead arranger, exposed banks take larger share of a loan and thus face higher contractual incentives to monitor. These stylized facts are consistent with the predicted e¤ect of a lender reputation loss when reputation and contractual incentives are substitutes.
In the next subsection we con…rm these results formally.
B. Reputation and Contractual Incentives
Table IV presents the estimated coe¢ cients of speci…cation (4), which measures the e¤ect of the Enron/WorldCom events on the supply of credit and lead shares. The …rst coe¢ cient, on the ExposedBank dummy is negative and signi…cant across all speci…cations. The magnitude, -0.35, implies that the proportion of exposed bank debt to not-exposed bank debt in new syndicated lending decreased by 35% during the year after the Enron fraud (Table IV, column 1). The magnitude increases to 48% when the post period is expanded to two years after the Enron fraud (Table IV, column 2). These estimates imply that the fraud discovery had a negative e¤ect on the credit supply of the banks that had a lending relationship with Enron and WorldCom during the year before the fraud discovery. The magnitude of the estimates is consistent with the unconditional evidence from Figure 3 , and is robust to excluding from the sample …rms in the energy, electrical equipment, and software industries, which potential commercial ties to Enron and WorldCom (Table IV, The estimated coe¢ cient on the interaction term, ExposedBank:LeadDebt, is positive and of the same magnitude in all speci…cations and subsamples. The estimate is signi…cant in all subsamples when estimated using the two-year post-Enron estimation period. The positive estimate implies that, conditional on being a lead arranger, banks with a lending relationship with Enron/WorldCom must retain a larger fraction of a syndicated loan after the frauds were discovered. The estimated magnitude of the coe¢ cient, 0.33, indicates that banks that su¤er a negative reputation shock must increase the fraction of a loan they retain as a lead arranger by close to 10 percentage points relative to the pre-fraud mean of 30.1%. This represents a substantial increase in the syndicate composition and the contractual incentives to monitor. The sign and magnitude of the coe¢ cient are consistent with the hypothesis that non-contractual incentives provided through reputation and contractual incentives provided through larger loan shares are substitutes in the context of syndicated lending.
We next investigate the heterogeneity of the e¤ect of the reputation shock across banks that had a direct monitoring role as lead arrangers to Enron and WorldCom and those with participant roles in the syndicated loans before the fraud discoveries. To do so we repeat the estimation of speci…cation (4) introducing a separate indicator for banks that were exposed as lead arrangers and as participants in syndicated loans before Enron events. Note that bank type j had two potential values per …rm i (exposed and not-exposed) in speci…cation (4), while it has three potential values (exposed as lead, exposed as participant, and not-exposed) in the new speci…cation. The point estimates are presented in Table V. Regarding the main coe¢ cients, the point estimates indicate that the negative reputation shock had a larger negative e¤ect on the supply of credit of banks with a lead role in syndicates prior to the frauds. However, the di¤erence is not statistically signi…cant at the standard levels. The estimates of the interaction coe¢ cients indicate that only banks exposed as lead arrangers experience a statistically signi…cant increase in contractual incentives through larger lead shares after the fraud events. The point estimates suggest that the increase in contractual incentives is roughly twice that experienced by banks exposed as participants.
Although this relative magnitude of the e¤ect is robust across all speci…cations, the di¤erence is again not statistically signi…cant. Thus, the cross sectional result are at most suggestive that the reputation shock had a larger e¤ect on the credit supply and lead shares of banks with a substantial monitoring role before the fraud events.
C. E¤ect on Credit Supply
The estimated magnitude of the main coe¢ cients of speci…cation (4) suggests that banks that su¤er a negative reputation shock reduce the supply of credit. Although debt substitution biases upwards the within-…rm estimates, in the most conservative scenario of full substitution in which the estimates are two times the real decline in lending, our estimates imply that the ‡ow of new syndicated credit declines by 24%. This result suggests that reputation plays a signi…cant role in the enforcement of syndicated loan contracts. Formal enforcement through contractual incentives is a poor substitute, and the depletion of reputation capital can potentially lead to an overall decline in credit availability. In this section we explore further the composition of the supply shock, the prevalence of substitution, and the consequences of the reputation shock for the overall availability of external …nancing to the a¤ected …rms.
We begin by corroborating a direct implication of the results so far on the supply of credit by lead arranger and by participants in new syndicated loans. Since a reputation loss implies in equilibrium that lead arrangers take on larger loan shares, the resulting substitution from participant to lead debt will have an amplifying (attenuating) e¤ect on the decline in the unconditional ‡ows of participant (lead) debt.
To verify this we estimate speci…cation (4) including only the ExposedBank dummy to estimate the e¤ect on the supply of credit using new lead debt and new participant debt separately as dependent variables. Note that this speci…cation aggregates the data at the bank-…rm pair level. We verify that the results discussed in the previous subsection are robust to this change in columns 1 and 2 of Table VI, which report the estimates of the collapsed speci…cation using all new syndicated credit. Columns 3 through 6 of Table VI report the estimated coe¢ cients using new lead debt and new participant debt. The point estimates of the e¤ect on the supply of lead credit are negative but extremely noisy and not statistically distinguishable from zero in all speci…cations. In contrast, the estimated e¤ect on the supply of participant debt is negative and signi…cant in all speci…cations.
This compositional e¤ect on the supply of credit is consistent with the reputation account and is di¢ cult to reconcile with other potential sources of variation in the supply of credit.
Several events with major potential economic implications occurred concurrently with the corporate fraud wave (i.e., general decline in the telecommunications industry, terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, Argentine default). If the lenders exposed to the fraudulent …rms were also disproportionately exposed to other shocks, our estimation can pick up the e¤ect of those events on the supply of credit. However, a credit supply reduction that is due, for example, to an increase in the banks'cost of capital, has no direct implications for the lead/participant composition of syndicated loans. 24 To explore the e¤ect on borrowers'overall credit availability and external cost of …nance we turn to the …rm FE panel speci…cation (5). This estimation relies on comparing …rms classi…ed as exposed to the Enron/WorldCom events through their main lenders, to …rms that were not. Table III showed that exposed …rms are larger and pay lower syndicated loan spreads than not-exposed …rms. This implies that the two groups of …rms are likely to di¤er in other unobservable dimensions. If these unobservable …rm characteristics vary over time and are related to the demand for credit and investment, the identi…cation assumptions of this di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation are suspect. However, if these unobserved characteristics are time-invariant or are balanced across the two groups, speci…cation (5) provides an unbiased estimate of the e¤ect on …rm outcomes.
To verify whether the identi…cation assumptions are likely to hold unconditionally, we plot in panel A of Figure 4 the time series of the average new syndicated loan ‡ows scaled by …rm assets. The pre-Enron means have been removed to ease the comparison. The ‡ow of syndicated credit evolves in parallel before the Enron events for the exposed and not-exposed …rms, which provides validation to the di¤erence-in-di¤erences identi…cation assumptions.
Also, the new origination amounts for the exposed …rms drop relative to the not-exposed …rms in the short run after the Enron events and remain lower on average in the long run.
Table VII presents the estimated e¤ect on total new syndicated debt ‡ows scaled by …rm assets. Column 1 shows that total new debt declines by 0.8 percentage points of total assets, which represents a 32% decline relative to the pre-Enron average from Table III . The magnitude of the decline is consistent with the results from the within-…rm estimation. To explore further the dynamics of the credit ‡ow changes we include an interaction between the exposed …rm dummy and a post dummy that turns to one during the second year after the Enron events (Table VII, To explore the extent of substitution, we estimate separately the e¤ect of the reputation shock on syndicated debt ‡ows from exposed and not-exposed banks. Columns 3 and 4 of Table VII show the results for exposed banks, which parallel those on total debt ‡ows. The fraud events reduce the ‡ow of new syndicated credit from exposed banks. This decline occurs mostly during the year after the Enron events, with a partial reversal afterwards. The fraud events have no e¤ect on the debt ‡ow from not-exposed banks to exposed …rms during the year after the reputation shock (Table VII , columns 5 and 6). During the second year, however, the ‡ow of debt from not-exposed banks increases. These estimates are consistent with substitution and imply that …rms increased their demand for credit from not-exposed banks after the supply of credit from exposed banks declined.
The negative reputation shock can cause a decline in the supply of credit through di¤er-ent channels. One possibility is that monitoring requires investment in acquiring …rm speci…c information, which implies that switching lead banks entails substantial costs. Another possibility is that the loss of reputation induces sharp declines in bank value and a¤ects bank ability to raise capital in the short run, which then a¤ects credit supply. A third possibility is that the reputation loss breaks down reciprocal agreements between lead arrangers and participants documented in Cai (2009) . We cannot distinguish through which channels reputation a¤ects credit supply in our empirical context.
D. Evidence from Loan Prices
Panel B of Figure 4 plots the time series of the average spread (relative to LIBOR) of new syndicated loans to exposed and not-exposed …rms. The spreads evolve in parallel before the Enron events. There is no obvious short term relative change in spreads paid by the exposed …rms during the year after the Enron events. However, spreads are 20 to 30 basis points higher on average two years after the fraud discoveries. The increase in new loan spreads occurs concurrently with the substitution of …nancing from exposed to not-exposed banks documented in the previous subsection. This suggests that substitution across …nancing sources comes at a cost in loan prices.
To con…rm this formally we estimate the parameters of speci…cation (5) using loan spreads as the dependent variable (Table VIII , columns 1 and 2). The sample size drops for this estimation because it excludes all …rm-quarter pairs where no loan occurs. The estimated e¤ect over the entire two-year post period indicate that loan spreads increase by 33 basis points on average after the Enron/WorldCom events, or 17.4% of the pre-Enron sample average (column 1). The overall results indicate that …rms whose main lenders were exposed to the fraud events experienced an increase in their external …nancing costs.
Since syndicated loans are traded in the secondary market, we can also estimate the e¤ect of the reputation shock on the market prices of the loans after they are issued. Secondary market prices can allow us, in principle, to distinguish the economic mechanism behind the reputation shock. If the corporate frauds re ‡ected poorly on the monitoring ability of the exposed banks, we expect that the same events will re ‡ect poorly on the quality of the loans issued by exposed banks prior to the fraud discovery. On the other hand, in a pure moral hazard model where bank monitoring e¤ort is unobservable, reputation serves as a commitment mechanism and bad outcomes will trigger reversion to the one shot game contract and monitoring levels, but will not a¤ect the assessed quality of the loans issued prior to the fraud discovery.
Secondary market loan price quotes are available from the Loan Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA) Mark-to-Market Pricing service. The unit of observation in the LSTA database is a pair between a loan facility and a quotation date. For each observation, it provides information on quote date, a loan identi…cation number that uniquely identi…es a loan facility and the borrower, number of quotes, average of the bid (ask) quotes, and the average of average bid (ask) quotes. A noteworthy caveat is that the LSTA database provides loan quotations rather than actual transaction prices. Thus, the estimated e¤ects must be interpreted as changes in the willingness to pay for the listed loans. Also, the database reveals the facility ID and/or LIN rather than the identity of the loan sellers and buyers. This implies that we cannot distinguish which part of the syndicated loan the quote applies to, and we must perform the secondary market price analysis at the …rm level. 25 Panel C of Figure 4 plots the time series of the median bid price for all of the …rm loans, measured as percentage points of par, averaged across …rms exposed and not-exposed to the fraud events through their lenders (pre-Enron means removed). The plot suggests that the median quotes for exposed …rms declined by 2 to 3 percentage points after the Enron events.
The absolute value of the change is an order of magnitude larger than the one implied by the change in spreads for new loans shown in panel B of Figure 4 . However, the DID estimate for the e¤ect of the frauds on the secondary market bids, shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table VIII, is 3.6 percentage points but not statistically signi…cant. Overall, the market price evidence 25 Out of 30,738 unique facilities in DealScan that were originated during 1999-2004 to U.S. …rms, 3,033 facilities are traded during 1999-2004 and matched to LSTA database using one of the two common …elds: facility ID and/or LIN. We are able to match 416 out of our …rm population data to the LSTA data. There are 4,529 facility-quarter pairs with at least one quote for these 416 unique borrowers. is suggestive that the fraud events re ‡ected poorly on the quality of borrowers associated with the a¤ected banks, but transaction in the secondary market occur infrequently and the estimates are too imprecise to reach de…nitive conclusions. Table IX shows the estimated e¤ect of the Enron/WorldCom events on …rm …nancial policy and investment obtained over the subsample of publicly traded …rms. In unreported estimations we verify that the results discussed so far hold on this subsample of …rms. The point estimates indicate that the reputations shock has a negative e¤ect on …rm leverage (Table IX , columns 1 and 2), but the e¤ect is only marginally signi…cant in some speci…cations. This suggests that …rms are able to substitute the decline in syndicated debt with other debt …nancing.
E. Financial Policy and Investment
The estimated e¤ect on cash (scaled by assets) is negative but insigni…cant in the short run, but positive and signi…cant during the second year after the Enron/WorldCom events across all speci…cations (Table IX, columns 3 and 4) . The magnitude indicates that cash holdings increase by 0.7 percentage points as a proportion of total assets, or 8.6% of the sample average. These estimates suggest that …rms'propensity to hold liquid assets changes in the medium run.
Finally, investment ‡ow in …xed assets drops substantially during the year of the Enron/WorldCom events, by 0.15 percentage points relative to total assets, or 8.8% of the sample mean (Table IX , columns 5 and 6). The estimates also indicate that investment ‡ows return to their original path two years after the events.
The overall …ndings suggest that the loss of reputation of a primary lender have a significant short term e¤ect on …rms'external cost of …nancing. There is evidence of substitution towards syndicated credit from una¤ected banks and from non-syndicated …nancing sources.
This suggests that the Enron and WorldCom events did not cause, or occur concurrently with, a generalized shortage of credit through all …nancing sources. However, substitution to other sources does come at a cost. Although we cannot measure the e¤ect of …nancing costs from other sources, the evidence on syndicated loan prices suggests the cost of substituting …nancing sources is substantial.
Firms'…nancial policy also reacts to the increase in external …nancing costs. Firms appear to hoard cash in the medium run, which is consistent with theories of precautionary cash stocks. Precautionary cash allows …rms to undertake valuable projects when outside …nancing is costly or unavailable. The higher precautionary stocks and …nancing substitution potentially explain why investment su¤ers only in the short run. Corporate …nancing and cash policies can mitigate the e¤ect of the lender reputation loss on investment in the long run.
VI. Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that bank monitoring reputation is a key determinant of the supply of credit, the characteristics of …nancial contracts, and investment. We exploit the Enron and WorldCom corporate frauds in 2001 and 2002 as a source of variation in their lenders'monitoring reputation. Using a within-…rm estimator, we …nd that the fraud discoveries cause a substantial decline in the supply of credit by banks with a prior lending relationship to these …rms. The decline is larger if the exposed lender was also a directly responsible for monitoring in syndicated lending. Consistent with the reputation channel, we …nd that exposed banks take on larger lead arranger shares conditional on participation as a lead arranger in a syndicated loan after the shock.
Our paper highlights the potential consequences of fraud on investment. Fraud involves expropriation of investors. Thus, an increase in its expected incidence can have large consequences on the supply of capital. The results in this paper show that this e¤ect is particularly strong through the banking sector.
The results of this paper are related to the academic and policy debate on the determinants and regulation of bank risk taking behavior. Evidence that competition lowers bank "charter values" (future rents) and can induce excessive risk taking and instability of the …-nancial sector has motivated regulation that limits bank competition and the use of leverage through reserve requirements. 26 The call for regulation is based on the premise that depositors, insulated from risk through deposit insurance, are banks'marginal suppliers of capital.
However, the …nancial innovations mentioned on the introductory paragraph imply that the marginal funding of modern …nancial institutions comes less from depositors, and more from sophisticated -and uninsured-investors. Our results show that in such an environment, market forces can induce a bank to increase its stake when its incentive to take risk increase.
The 2008 …nancial crisis that followed our sample period, however, suggests that these market forces alone do not induce su¢ cient monitoring. This is striking considering the magnitude of the value losses that result from a reputation loss implicit in our estimates.
A 10 percentage point increase in lead banks shares implies a substantial decline in capital intermediation through the syndicated debt market, which allocates more than $1 trillion of debt per year. Furthermore, in the worst case scenario where the entire loss estimated in the event studies is attributed to reputation capital, a reputation loss results in a 5 to 8% decline of a bank's total market capitalization. To induce adequate monitoring, …nancial regulation must increase bank potential losses in case of malfeasance discovery, either through penalties or minimum capital requirements, that exceed the costs implied by these estimates. The dependent variable represents the change in average debt of type l (lead or participant) of firm i with with bank type j (exposed or not-exposed), before and after the shock. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm industry level. *, ** and *** statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 
Figure 1 Lender Cumulative Net Return during 20 Trading Days around Enron/WorldCom Bankruptcies, by Lender Role in Enron/WorldCom Syndicated Lending Panel A. Event: Enron Bankruptcy Announcement
Post-Enron Estimation
Table V Effect of Enron/WorldCom Frauds on the Composition of Syndicates, by
Role of the Exposed Lender in the Syndicate Estimation results of within-firm specification (2) augmented to include a separate indicator for banks that were exposed as lead arrangers and as participants in syndicated loans before Enron events:
The dependent variable represents the change in average debt of type l (lead or participant) of firm i with with bank type j (exposed or not-exposed), before and after the shock. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm industry level. *, ** and *** statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. The dependent variable is the average flow of new syndicated credit to firm i from bank type j (exposed, not-exposed) after the Enron bankruptcy (4 th quarter of 2000 and afterwards), minus the average flow of new syndicated credit to firm i from bank type j before the Enron bankruptcy. Columns 3 and 4 (5 and 6) use new syndicated debt by lead arrangers (participants) of the syndicate. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm industry level. *, ** and *** statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. The dependent variable is an outcome for firm i at quarter t. The right-hand side variable of interest is the interaction between a dummy equal to one if it is classified as exposed to the shock, and a dummy equal to one for the post-shock period (after the third quarter of 2000).
Post-Enron Estimation
Originating Bank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel 1. Full Sample
FirmExposed x PostEnron -0.0083*** -0.0123*** -0.0070*** -0.0090*** -0.0004 -0.002 (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0016) FirmExposed x PostEnron_plus1year 0.0076*** 0.0039*** 0.0030** (0.0017) (0.0008) (0.0012) The dependent variable is the interest rate spread relative to LIBOR in basis points (and median secondary market bid in percentage points of par) for firm i at quarter t. The right-hand side variable of interest is the interaction between a dummy equal to one if it is classified as exposed to the shock, and a dummy equal to one for the post-shock period (after the third quarter of 2000).
( 1 )
( 2 ) The dependent variable is debt, cash balance, and capital expenditures (scaled by assets) for firm i at quarter t. The right-hand side variable of interest is the interaction between a dummy equal to one if it is classified as exposed to the shock, and a dummy equal to one for the post-shock period (after the third quarter of 2000). 
